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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Patrick Giltz was convicted of felony domestic violence following a jury trial,
and was sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, with three years fixed. He appeals from his
judgment of conviction, raising two issues. First, Mr. Giltz contends the district court abused its
discretion by ruling the State could impeach him with his two prior felony convictions for
burglary. Second, Mr. Giltz contends the district court erred in instructing the jury it was not
necessary for it to decide whether he struck the victim with an open or closed fist. This Court
should vacate Mr. Giltz’s conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 28, 2016, Mr. Giltz and his long-time girlfriend, Lisa Bilquist, got into an
altercation at their residence, and Ms. Bilquist sustained serious injuries as a result. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”), p.3.) Ms. Bilquist testified that Mr. Giltz struck her with a “closehanded” punch after she made him a meal he did not like, and she refused to smoke marijuana
with him. (Tr., p.200, L.15 – p.202, L.2, p.227, Ls.2-3.) Ms. Bilquist acknowledged on crossexamination that she told the investigating police officer that she was kicking the shit out of
Mr. Giltz during their altercation. (Tr., p.242, Ls.18-21.) Mr. Giltz, who was never interviewed
by the investigating officer, testified he went to the bathroom and saw Ms. Bilquist injecting
methamphetamine in her neck, and then she grabbed something off the counter and tried to stab
him. (Tr., p.190, Ls.14-15, p.296, Ls.1-18, p.299, L.20, p.300, L.1.) Mr. Giltz testified that,
after Ms. Bilquist swung at him, he “open-palmed her with one hand” in self-defense.
(Tr., p.300, L.18 – p.301, L.1.) Ms. Bilquist testified she and Mr. Giltz smoke marijuana “[a]ll
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day long” but she did not use methamphetamine on the day of the incident. (Tr., p.225, Ls.1722, p.236, Ls.16-20.)
Mr. Giltz was charged by Information with one count of felony domestic violence.
(R., pp.50-51.) The State alleged Mr. Giltz “did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence
upon the person of Lisa Bilquist by punching Lisa Bilquist in the face with a closed fist, and by
committing said battery, did inflict a traumatic injury . . . .” (R., pp.50-51.) The State filed an
Information Part II alleging Mr. Giltz was a persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho
Code § 19-2514. (R., pp.89, 96-97.)
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to impeach Mr. Giltz pursuant to Idaho Rule
of Evidence 609, stating it intended to question Mr. Giltz on cross-examination about his two
burglary convictions in CR-2001-35670-C. (R., pp.74-75.) Counsel for Mr. Giltz objected,
arguing the convictions were not relevant to Mr. Giltz’s credibility. (Tr., p.8, L.19 – p.9, L.8,
p.13, Ls.8-11.) The district court ruled it would allow the State to cross-examine Mr. Giltz
regarding the fact of his prior convictions because burglary “is typically a theft crime.”
(Tr., p.15, Ls.17-20.)

The district court did not consider whether the probative value of

Mr. Giltz’s prior convictions outweighed their prejudicial impact. Mr. Giltz testified at trial, and
was questioned about his prior convictions on direct and cross examination. (Tr., p.294, Ls.1618, p.339, Ls.1-5.) The State also emphasized Mr. Giltz’s status as a convicted felon in closing
argument. (Tr., p.387, Ls.14-17.)
The jury was instructed that, in order for Mr. Giltz to be guilty of domestic battery with
traumatic injury, the State had to prove, among other things, that Mr. Giltz “committed a battery
upon Lisa Bilquist by punching Lisa Bilquist in the face with a closed fist.” (R., p.130.) This
instruction was consistent with the charging instrument. (R., pp.50-51.) The jury asked one
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question during its deliberations, “How important is the ‘closed fist’ wording in #3 of Instruction
#14? Are we determining whether the initial hit or we believe secondary hits were done with a
closed fist? Is a closed fist equivalent to an open fist?” (R., p.140.) Over defense counsel’s
objection, the district court instructed the jury, “For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary
for you to decide whether the defendant struck with an open or closed fist.” (Tr., p.439, Ls.3-5,
Ls.23-25.) After receiving this instruction, the jury found Mr. Giltz guilty of felony domestic
violence. (Tr., p.443, Ls.2-4; R., p.141.) The district court then found Mr. Giltz guilty of being
a persistent violator. (Tr., p.444, Ls.20-21, p.450, Ls.5-10.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Giltz to a unified term of fifteen years, with three years
fixed. (Tr., p.484, Ls.12-14.) The judgment of conviction was filed on January 5, 2018, and
Mr. Giltz filed a timely notice of appeal on January 9, 2018. (R., pp.172-75, 178-80.) The
district court subsequently entered an order requiring Mr. Giltz to pay $32,004.03 in restitution
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305.1 (R., pp.182-84.)
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Mr. Giltz subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35, which the district court denied. (R., p.190.) Mr. Giltz does not challenge the
district court’s denial of this motion on appeal in light of State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203
(2007).
3

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ruling the State could impeach Mr. Giltz with
his two prior felony convictions for burglary?

II.

Did the district court err in instructing the jury it was not necessary for it to decide
whether Mr. Giltz struck the victim with an open or closed fist?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ruling The State Could Impeach Mr. Giltz With His
Two Prior Felony Convictions For Burglary
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded prior to trial that the State could impeach Mr. Giltz with his

two prior felony convictions for burglary pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609. The district
court abused its discretion in making this ruling because it failed to consider whether the
probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact. The State cannot show that
the district court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Mr. Giltz’s prior
convictions had little, if any, impeachment value, and his credibility was central to his defense.
Mr. Giltz is entitled to a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 states in pertinent part:
For the purposes of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness, evidence of
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the
felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public
record, but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the
jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or
both, are relevant to the witness’s character for truthfulness and that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
party offering the witness.

I.R.E. 609(a) (emphasis added). Under this rule, “the trial court must apply a two-prong test to
determine whether evidence of [a] prior conviction should be admitted: (1) the court must
determine whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness’ credibility; and
(2) if so, the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial impact.” State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630 (1999) (citation omitted).
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“In reviewing the trial court’s decision as to the first prong concerning relevance, the
standard of review is de novo.” Thompson, 132 Idaho at 630 (citation omitted). “In reviewing
the trial court’s decision as to the second prong concerning whether the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Id.
(citation omitted).

When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the

appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:

(1) whether the lower court

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Within The Boundaries Of Its Discretion And
Consistently With The Legal Standards Applicable To The Choice Before It Because It
Failed To Consider Whether The Probative Value Of Mr. Giltz’s Prior Convictions
Outweighed Their Prejudicial Impact
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice pursuant to I.R.E. 609 stating it intended to impeach

Mr. Giltz with his two prior convictions for burglary in CR-2001-35670-C. (R., p.74.) Counsel
for Mr. Giltz objected on the grounds that the convictions were not relevant to Mr. Giltz’s
credibility. (Tr., p.8, L.19 – p.9, L.8, p.13, Ls.8-11.) The district court ruled it would allow the
State to cross-examine Mr. Giltz regarding the fact of his prior convictions because burglary “is
typically a theft crime.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.17-20.) Counsel for Mr. Giltz said he was “a little
puzzled” by the district court’s ruling, and the district court responded:
That’s what the rule says, and so I don’t look behind the nature of the conviction.
But overall, I think burglary falls in that category. It typically falls into that
category of crimes involving theft. That’s the usual burglary. It’s a – it’s an – it’s
not a theft crime, per se, but it is closely related to the same kind of conduct that is
theft. And, to me, that has a bearing on, or a reflection, that would have some
bearing on the issue of credibility.
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(Tr., p.16, L.20 – p.17, L.5.) The district court did not consider whether the probative value of
Mr. Giltz’s prior convictions outweighed their prejudicial impact. (See id.)
At trial, the district court questioned Mr. Giltz regarding his decision to testify. The
district court asked Mr. Giltz if he was aware that he could be required to answer questions
regarding his criminal history and he answered, “Do I have a choice in that matter, as far as my
previous history?” (Tr., p.261, Ls.3-16.) The district court responded, “No. That has been
discussed and ruled upon. I have allowed the State to inquire concerning the fact that you have a
prior felony conviction. It’s bearing on credibility.” (Tr., p.261, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Giltz testified
in his defense. On direct examination, he was asked, “And at some point in the past, have you
been convicted of a felony?” (Tr., p.294, Ls.16-17.) Mr. Giltz answered, “Yes, I have.”
(Tr., p.294, L.18.)

On cross-examination, the last question the prosecutor asked Mr. Giltz

concerned his prior felony convictions. (Tr., p.339, Ls.1-5.) In closing, the prosecutor argued to
the jury, “Now, he admitted that he has some felony convictions. You can consider if that
impacts his credibility, if you think that detracts from his credibility or not.” (Tr., p.387, Ls.1417.)
In State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573 (1981), the Court recognized that “different felonies
have different degrees of probative value on the issue of credibility.” Id. at 580 (quoting
People v. Rollo, 569 P.2d 771, 775 (Cal. 1977)). The Ybarra Court adopted the three categories
of felonies the California Supreme Court used in Rollo to determine whether a prior conviction
can be used for impeachment. Id. at 580-81. Category one includes crimes such as perjury
which are “intimately connected” with the issue of credibility. Id. at 580. Category two includes
crimes such as robbery or burglary which are “somewhat less relevant” to the issue of

7

credibility. Id. at 580. Finally, category three includes crimes of violence, which “generally
have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.” Id. at 581 (quotation marks omitted).
Under this framework, the district court correctly concluded Mr. Giltz’s prior convictions
for burglary had some relevance to the issue of credibility. But this is the beginning, not the end,
of the I.R.E. 609 analysis. To determine whether evidence of a prior conviction should be
admitted, a trial court must determine not only whether the evidence is relevant to credibility, but
also whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.

See

Thompson, 132 Idaho at 630 (1999); see also State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 30 (1997); State v.
Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789 (Ct. App. 2012). In State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066 (Ct. App. 1990),
the Court of Appeals held the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant’s
prior felony conviction where “the judge considered the impeachment value of the prior crime,
the remoteness of the prior conviction, the witness’s criminal history, the similarity between the
past crime and the crime charged, the importance of the witness’s testimony, the centrality of the
credibility issue, and the nature and extent of the witness’ criminal record as a whole.” Id. at
1073. Here, the district court did not consider any of these factors, and did not engage in any
balancing of the probative value of Mr. Giltz’s prior convictions against their prejudicial impact.
This was an abuse of discretion, as it was not consistent with the legal standard set forth in I.R.E.
609 and the case law interpreting that rule.

D.

The State Cannot Show Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The District Court’s Error
Was Harmless
Counsel for Mr. Giltz objected to the admission of the prior conviction evidence in the

district court, and the district court overruled the objection, and concluded the evidence was
admissible under I.R.E. 609. (Tr., p.8, L.19 – p.9, L.8, p.13, Ls.8-11, p.15, Ls.17-20.) Because
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the error was objected to below, the State has the burden of demonstrating the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-22 (2010). To meet its
burden, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
verdict. See State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013). “To say that an error did not contribute to the
verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on
the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403
(1991)). “Thus, an appellate court’s inquiry is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted, emphasis in original). The State cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
district court’s in this case was harmless.
When weighing the probative value of a defendant’s prior felony conviction against its
prejudicial effect, courts may consider several factors, including the impeachment value of the
prior crime, the remoteness of the prior conviction, the witness’s criminal history, the similarity
between the past crime and the crime charged, the importance of the witness’s testimony, the
centrality of the credibility issue, and the nature and extent of the witness’s criminal record as a
whole. See Thompson, 132 Idaho at 633; Grist, 152 Idaho at 790; Rodgers, 119 Idaho at 1073.
Considering these factors, Mr. Giltz’s burglary convictions had little impeachment value, but
were highly prejudicial. They thus should have been excluded by the district court, and it cannot
be said that the guilty verdict rendered in this case was surely unattributable to the error in the
admission of this evidence.
Considering the factors listed above, the district court should not have allowed the State
to question Mr. Giltz regarding his prior burglary convictions as they had little, if any,
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impeachment value. The State did not introduce any evidence at the pre-trial motion hearing
regarding the circumstances surrounding Mr. Giltz’s prior convictions. (See generally Tr., p.10,
L.24 – p.12, L.3.) At trial, the State introduced certified records related to the convictions, but
none of these records provide any information regarding the factual circumstances of the
offenses. (See State’s Exs. 24, 27.) The records reflect that Mr. Giltz was convicted of two
counts of burglary under Idaho Code § 18-1401. (State’s Ex. 24.) This statute states in pertinent
part that “[e]very person who enters any house . . . or other building . . . with intent to commit
any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary.” I.C. § 18-1401. It is not clear from the record
what structure Mr. Giltz entered, and what felony he intended to commit therein. It is clear,
however, that these convictions were remote in time to the instant offense, and do not have any
similarity with the instant offense. Mr. Giltz was convicted of burglary in May 2001, and
released from prison in August 2009, over seven years before the domestic dispute which led to
the charge in this case. (State’s Ex. 24; Tr., p.11, Ls.7-11; PSI, p.3.) There is no indication that
the burglaries Mr. Giltz committed were violent, and Mr. Giltz does not have any prior domestic
violence charges. (PSI, pp.5-9.)
Mr. Giltz’s credibility was central to his defense, as this was ultimately a “he said, she
said” case regarding the circumstances leading up to a domestic dispute. Mr. Giltz admitted
striking his girlfriend with an open palm, but explained he acted in self-defense after she swung
at him, and after she injected methamphetamine in her neck. (Tr., p.298, Ls.1-11, p.300, L.18 –
p.301, L.1.) Ms. Bilquist testified Mr. Giltz struck her with a closed fist after she made a meal
that he did not like, and after she refused to smoke marijuana with him. (Tr., p.200, L.15 –
p.202, L.2, p.227, Ls.2-3.) The State offered testimony from other witnesses regarding the
injuries Ms. Bilquist sustained, among other things, but no one else testified regarding the
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circumstances leading up to the altercation.

The jury appeared to question Ms. Bilquist’s

account of the events, as the only question it asked during its deliberations concerned whether it
had to find Mr. Giltz struck Ms. Bilquist with a closed fist, as she testified.

(R., p.140.)

Considering the evidence presented at trial and the significance of the conflicting testimony of
Mr. Giltz and Ms. Bilquist, the State cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that the district
court’s error in allowing the admission of Mr. Giltz’s prior convictions was harmless.
A factually analogous case is State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2012). In Joy, a husband and
wife were involved in a domestic altercation, which resulted in domestic violence charges being
brought against the husband. Id. at 4. At trial, the district court improperly admitted evidence of
the defendant’s prior misconduct over the defendant’s objection. Id. at 4. On appeal, the State
acknowledged that the evidence securing the conviction was “relatively weak” and the credibility
of the wife was an issue, but argued the inclusion of the inadmissible evidence was harmless. Id.
at 12. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because the case hinged upon the conflicting
testimony of the husband and wife and upon whose version of events the jury believed, the State
had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict was unaffected by the error. Id.
Like in Joy, the State cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilty verdict the
jury rendered was unaffected by the district court’s error in admitting evidence of Mr. Giltz’s
prior convictions. Mr. Giltz’s credibility was central to this case, and the evidence the State
presented regarding the circumstances of the altercation was hardly overwhelming. Mr. Giltz
testified he acted in self-defense, and the jury appeared to credit at least some of his testimony in
asking about the importance of the closed fist instruction. This Court should vacate Mr. Giltz’s
conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.
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II.
The District Court Erred In Instructing The Jury It Was Not Necessary For It To Decide Whether
Mr. Giltz Struck The Victim With An Open Or Closed Fist

A.

Introduction
The jury asked one question during its deliberations, “How important is the ‘closed fist’

wording in #3 of Instruction #14? Are we determining whether the initial hit or we believe
secondary hits were done with a closed fist? Is a closed fist equivalent to an open fist?”
(R., p.140.) Over defense counsel’s objection, the district court instructed the jury “it is not
necessary for you to decide whether the defendant struck with an open or closed fist.”
(Tr., p.439, Ls.3-5, Ls.23-25.) The district court erred in providing this instruction to the jury as
it was inconsistent with the charging instrument and thus created a variance. The variance was
fatal because it violated Mr. Giltz’s right to fair notice of the charge against him. Mr. Giltz is
entitled to a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law over which we exercise

free review.” State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 495 (Ct. App. 2011).

C.

The District Court’s Instruction Created A Fatal Variance As It Violated Mr. Giltz’s
Right To Fair Notice Of The Charge Against Him
The Information alleged Mr. Giltz “did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence

upon the person of Lisa Bilquist by punching Lisa Bilquist in the face with a closed fist, and by
committing said battery, did inflict a traumatic injury . . . .” (R., pp.50-51.) This is the charge
Mr. Giltz had notice of, and that he went to trial to defend against. At trial, Ms. Bilquist testified
Mr. Giltz struck her with a “close-handed” fist. (Tr., p.227, Ls.2-3.) Mr. Giltz testified he
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“open-palmed” Ms. Bilquist in self-defense. (Tr., p.300, L.20 – p.301, L.1.) The jury was
instructed that the State had to prove, among other things, that Mr. Giltz “committed a battery
upon Lisa Bilquist by punching Lisa Bilquist in the face with a closed fist.” (R., p.130.) The
jury asked one question during its deliberations, “How important is the ‘closed fist’ wording in
#3 of Instruction #14? Are we determining whether the initial hit or we believe secondary hits
were done with a closed fist? Is a closed fist equivalent to an open fist?” (R., p.140.)
In responding to the jury’s question, the prosecutor told the district court, “Your Honor, I
don’t believe that the State has to prove whether it was a closed first or an open fist. That said, I
think that the answer should probably refer . . . them to what I think was Instruction 14, the
definition of a battery. Because, obviously . . . what the State has to prove is whether . . . willful
and unlawful force or violence was used, not the matter of the closed or open fist.” (Tr., p.433,
Ls.11-19.) Counsel for Mr. Giltz asked the district court to “just respond to the jury that they
have the instructions” and “just need to apply the facts to the law and come to a conclusion.”
(Tr., p.433, L.24 – p.434, L.10.) The district court responded as follows:
I don’t think I can do that in this case, not given the nature of the question. That’s
not going to resolve it, because the issue is clearly a variance between the exact
language used in the information, which I used in the charging instruction, and the
two different versions of the same thing that happened at the time that nobody
disputes.
She was hit in the face. The State for whatever reason, chose to charge it as “hit
with a closed fist.” The defendant has, essentially, testified to all of the elements
of the charge but with justification. And leaving the jury to scratch their head
over that part of it, I don’t think is appropriate. So I think we have to give an
answer other than go back and reread the instruction, because I trust they have
followed my instructions and have already pondered that.
(Tr., p.434, L.11 – p.435, L.3.) The district court said, “I am inclined to, in essence, without
calling it an amendment, amend Instruction No. 14 and simply tell them, for purposes of this
case, it is not necessary for you to determine whether the defendant struck with an open or closed
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fist, and leave it at that.” (Tr., p.436, Ls.5-10.) Counsel for Mr. Giltz suggested that the district
court refer the jury to the instruction on the definition of battery. (Tr., p.437, Ls.23-25.) The
district court responded:
My concern with that is . . . it doesn’t answer the question they have posed. I
don’t think they are confused over what a battery is; I think they are confused
about an instruction . . . that recites the language in the information. And then
that brings us to the next question as to whether or not the language in the
information is a necessary element of the crime. And in this case, I don’t believe
that the additional statement is an element of the crimes, the closed fist. It’s the
striking.
So with that, and taking into account the comments of counsel, I am still going to
instruct the jury that, for purposes of this case, they need not decide between a
closed fist or an open fist.
(Tr., p.438, Ls.1-17.) Counsel for Mr. Giltz reiterated his general objection. (Tr., p.439, Ls.3-5.)
The district court then instructed the jury as follows: “For the purposes of this case, it is not
necessary for you to decide whether the defendant struck with an open or closed fist.”
(Tr., p.439, Ls.23-25.) The jury then found Mr. Giltz guilty. (Tr., p.443, Ls.2-4.)
The district court’s instruction to the jury created a variance with the charging instrument,
which was fatal in this case. In analyzing this issue, this Court “must first determine whether
there is a variance between the information used to charge the defendant and either the
instructions presented to the jury or the evidence adduced at trial.” Grove, 151 Idaho at 495-96.
If a variance exists, the Court “must examine whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error
requiring reversal of the conviction.” Id. at 496. “A determination of whether a variance is fatal
depends on whether the basic functions of the pleading requirement have been met.” Id. “A
charging instrument meets the basic functions of the pleading requirement if it fairly informs the
defendant of the charges against which he or she must defend and enables him or her to plead an
acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Id.

14

In sum, a variance between a charging document and a jury instruction or the
evidence adduced at trial requires reversal only when it deprives the defendant of
his substantial rights by violating the defendant’s right to fair notice or leaving
him or her open to the risk of double jeopardy. A review of whether the
defendant was deprived of his or her right to fair notice requires the court to
determine whether the record suggests the possibility that the defendant was
misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his or her defense.
Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the district court recognized the instruction it was providing to the jury created a
variance, but concluded the variance was not fatal because the language contained in the
Information regarding the closed fist was not a necessary element of the crime. (Tr., p.438, Ls.117.) The district court did not consider whether the variance deprived Mr. Giltz of this right to
fair notice and, in this case, it did. Mr. Giltz believed he needed to defend against a charge that
he struck his girlfriend with a closed fist. He entered a plea of not guilty, and proceeded to trial,
because he struck his girlfriend with an open palm, in self-defense.
A factually analogous case is State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56 (Ct. App. 1998). In Sherrod,
the Court of Appeals concluded an inconsistency between the information and the jury
instructions constituted a fatal variance because it prejudiced the defendant in the presentation of
his defense. Id. at 60-61. The amended information charged the defendant with aggravated
battery by alleging he “did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon the person of [the
victim], causing great bodily harm and/or permanent disfigurement, to wit: by stabbing [the
victim] in the back.” Id. at 58. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the State had to
prove the defendant “committed a battery upon [the victim]; and . . . when doing so the
defendant caused great bodily harm, or permanent disfigurement, or used a deadly weapon or
instrument.” Id. The Court of Appeals determined the jury instruction departed from the
charged offense because “it allowed the jury to find that [the defendant] caused great bodily
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harm or permanent disfigurement based upon any of the injuries that may have been suffered by
the victim, whereas the amended information specifically limited the alleged injury to stabbing in
the back.” Id. at 59. The Court concluded the variance was fatal because the defendant was not
placed on notice of a need to present evidence or argument that the victim’s other injuries were
of insufficient severity to amount to great bodily harm or permanent disfigurement. Id. at 60.
Similarly, in State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of Appeals
concluded there was a fatal variance where the information alleged the defendant committed two
counts of aggravated battery by shooting the victim’s knuckle or shooting the tip of the victim’s
finger. Id. at 329. In contrast, the jury instruction allowed the jury to find great bodily harm
based upon other injuries suffered by the victim. Id. at 330. The Court explained that “[a]
criminal defendant is entitled to be apprised by the charging instrument not only of the name of
the offense charged but in general terms of the manner in which it is alleged to have been
committed.” Id. at 331-32.
Just as in Sherrod and Brazil, the variance between the Information and the district
court’s instruction to the jury created a fatal variance because it deprived Mr. Giltz of his right to
fair notice of the charge against him. The record clearly suggests the possibility that Mr. Giltz
was misled in the preparation or presentation of his defense by the use of the “closed fist”
language in the Information, which the district court effectively eliminated by its instruction.
This Court should vacate Mr. Giltz’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

16

CONCLUSION
Mr. Giltz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
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